ABSTRACT. -Recent research on the functioning of labour markets has placed great emphasis on the role of job turnover. Turnover rates have important implications for wage determination, work organisation, career prospects and various other aspects of the employment relationship. A topic which has not received much attention in the literature is concerned with the impact of unions on firms' accession-separation decisions. Union practices are deemed to have a significant impact on firms' turnover rate influencing both hiring and quits-dismissals decisions. The present paper attempts to explore union effects on turnover in the context of the Italian labour market. Different theoretical implications for the analysis of accessions and separations rates within the establishment is presented and discussed. The empirical model is then specified and estimated using establishment level data for the Italian metal-mechanical engineering industry. In the attempt to ascertain the different routes through which union presence affects turnover rates, a different treatment of the various sources of separations (quits, incentivated separations, dismissals) is proposed. Empirical evidence suggests that Italian trade unions have succeeded in reducing turnover.
Introduction
Turnover rates have important implications for wage determination, work organisation, career prospects and various other aspects of the employment relationship. One relevant aspect which has not been thoroughly investigated is concerned with the impact of unions on firms' accession-separation decisions. Union practices are deemed to have a significant impact on firms' turnover rate influencing both hiring and quits-dismissals decisions. The present paper attempts to explore union effects on turnover in Italy. First, the evolution of both trade union density and turnover patterns, in recent decades, is explored and confronted with the institutional setting existing in Italy. Next, we analyse the main determinants of the worker-firm separation probability -initiated either by the employee or by the employerwith particular reference to the effects of unionism. The data set used contains information on 3,000 establishments of the Italian metal-mechanical engineering industry. The sample matches information on turnover rate, wage levels and other relevant establishment characteristics, as well as information on union presence and union behaviour in the establishment. Results confirm the usual finding that unionised plants have generally lower turnover rates. Moreover it is shown that workers in highly unionised establishments are less likely to quit, as compared to workers employed in low unionised plants even at comparable job tenure. Finally, the paper shows how trade unions are able to influence worker exit behaviour not only by raising wages above the market clearning level but also through several non-wage effects (i.e. better job conditions and work environment, ecc.).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 focuses on the characteristics of the Italian industrial relations system in the last two decades and reviews some of the theoretical implications of labour turnover. Section 3 presents the data. The empirical specification and the econometric issues involved in the analysis are developed in section 4. The main findings are presented in section 5. The last section contains some concluding remarks.
Union Labour Turnover and the Institutional Setting
The question of labour market flexibility has been widely debated in all European countries. As far as Italy is concerned it is difficult to regard labour market flexibility as a constant factor in time. Over a sufficiently lengthy period of time the role of institutions (i.e. unions and labour legislation) changes as their objectives, presence and strength change, so does the degree of labour market flexibility. If we consider for instance the degree of flexibility of wages or the degree of the so-called numerical flexibility (i.e. the flexibility of adjusting the level of employment), we note that they have not remained at a constant level (REICHLIN and SALVATI [1990] ; DELL'ARINGA and LUCIFORA [1990] ). They were certainly lower in the seventies than in the eighties and the nineties.
The Italian industrial relations system, in the seventies, was characterized by a strong autonomous push both on the general level of wages and on wage differentials, as well as on labour mobility. Labour share in industrial value added increased sharply between 1969 and 1974 and roughly remained at that high level for the rest of the decade (see table 1 ). This was a phase of rising unionisation and industrial unrest. Unions rapidly adopted bargaining objectives which were in line with the demands of the semi-skilled workers which represented the majority of their members: "flat-rate" increases in pay, working time reductions, union control of the work process and, above all, strong opposition to any form of dismissals. The result was a strong wage push, a drastic reduction in dismissals and more generally in overall labour mobility. The available figures show that, in the sixties, turnover rates grew with employment. From 1970 onward, when employment stopped growing, turnover rates show a sharp decline. There is no doubt that the two phenomena are closely connected: turnover rates are usually linked to the ups and downs of the labour market. However, such a sharp drop in turnover rates cannot be entirely imputed to the worsening of the demand and supply conditions on the labour market. Similar conclusions are reached when investigating dismissal figures. Until the beginning of the seventies the figures show a normal anticyclical behaviour; conversely, their behaviour changes considerably afterwards. As the labour market entered in a state of crisis, a strong increase in dismissals was expected, yet dismissals exhibit a sudden drop. In 1975, after a serious crisis in industrial production, the dismissal rate reached its lowest level (5%). Ten years earlier, in 1965, with employment in similar (but maybe less serious) depressed conditions, dismissals in one year amounted to twenty percent of total employed workers. There is no doubt that the institutional framework had completely changed in those ten years and the increase in the union power accounts for the heavy decrease in dismissals. The opposition of trade unions to dismissals and the increase in the bargaining leverage of the workers within the firm account for the steep turnover drop which occurred in those years. Turnover dropped from nearly 40% in the sixties (a level which was very close to that of the US industry) to 15% in 1977 and to even lower figures in the following years (see table 1 ).
Another factor which explains the drastic drops in dismissals was the new employment protection legislation introduced in Italy at the beginning of the seventies. A new and comprehensive Labour Act -the so-called "Statuto dei Lavoratori"-was introduced in 1970. It regulated, among other matters, hiring and firing practices, as well as mobility rules within the firm. These new regulations drastically constrained the firms' choice set in deciding about employment matters. The "Statuto dei Lavoratori" was the first step towards a more rigid regulation of the functioning of the industrial labour market. Other laws concerning fixed-term labour contracts, individual dismissals and the use of temporary lay-offs (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) were passed in the following years. These interventions made it more difficult for employers to dismiss their workers both on individual and collective basis, for either disciplinary or economic reasons. The opposition of unions to dismissals and to lay-offs in a period in which legislation was more favourable to workers, accounts for the fall in labour turnover, and in general for the labour mobility rates of those years.
The Italian experience seems to contradict the hypothesis according to which job protection legislation tends to increase and not to decrease quits. The idea is that improvements in job security make it more worthwhile to quit because they reduce the probability that alternative jobs will be unexpectedly terminated. Considering the British experience, BURGESS and NICKELL [1989] conclude that although employment protection legislation slowed down the rate of employment change and reduced the lay-off rate, it does not appear to have reduced overall turnover. Conversely, the job protection legislation introduced in Italy in the seventies has probably interacted with the increasing pressure coming from the unions, to increase job stability by reducing lay-offs and dismissals; moreover, in this way, real wages have been increased and quits reduced. In that context the reduction of quits can be described with reference both to the increase in the monopoly wage, as well as to a "voice mechanism".
The institutional setting changed drastically in the eighties and a new scenario appeared. On the whole it was the overall flexibility of the labour market that showed a sort of turning point (DELL'ARINGA and LUCIFORA [1990] ). Labour share in value added decreased and the levelling of differentials that had marked the wage structure in the seventies was sharply reversed: this was mainly due to the reappearance of a sort of wage drift induced by unilateral employers' pay concessions. At the beginning of the eighties labour productivity increased along its trend despite the stagnation in industrial production. Industrial employment fell heavily and a strong increase in the unemployment rate was recorded.
There were signs of increase in numerical and internal organisational flexibility. Labour gradually became more willing (and to some extent was compelled) to adapt itself to in-plant reorganisation. Trade unions made concessions regarding fixed-term employment contracts (especially for young workers), part-time employment (about which Italian trade unions had always been highly suspicious) and recruitment methods (which were partly liberalised). Labour legislation has been adopted to take into account the outcomes of tripartite agreements in which unions made these concessions. Although Italian labour legislation still presents a higher degree of rigidity if compared with that of other Europeans countries, some steps towards a less rigid institutional setting have been made during the 1980s. Other indicators give additional information on the extent of this change of attitude and climate (see table 1 ). Also the number of hours lost for strike and the number of working hours lost due to absenteeism exhibited a sharp drop (DELL'ARINGA and LUCIFORA [1990] ).
Turnover rates recovered part of the previous levels. With the available data on labour turnover it is not possible to conduct an appropriate empirical analysis. Data before 1976 are not consistent with those after that year and moreover the Ministry of labour stopped collecting the data in 1985. After 1985 the only data on labour turnover are those collected by Istat and refer to industrial firms with more than 500 employees. These data are available from the beginning of the 1980s, but they represent a limited segment of the industrial labour market and, moreover, data on separations are not splitted in dismissals and quits. Turnover data appear in figure 1 showing a certain recovery of the separation rate in the first part of the 1980s, and a further increase in the following years. Separation rates kept increasing from the beginning of the 1980s and by the beginning of the 1990s reached and bypassed the peak level of the 1970s. The long cycle of Italian labour flexibility is well documented by the ups and downs of these indicators. A final indicator which can track the changing strength of the unions in the last 20 years is the rate of unionisation of the Italian labour force. It presents over time more or less the opposite behaviour of the separation rate: an increasing rate in the 1970s and a decreasing rate in the 1990s. Union strength and turnover rate are negatively correlated over time and the Italian experience seems to demonstrate that there is a causal relationship between the two.
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Unions and Turnover: Monopoly Versus "Voice" Effects
The standard theory of trade union behaviour suggests that unions might reduce turnover rates by raising wages above the market clearing level. According to the monopoly union model trade unions set wages, leaving to the firm the decision to set the employment level. Given the assumptions that unions maximise their members' utility and firms maximise profits, the model implies an equilibrium with wages above the market clearing level and employment lower than in perfect competition. A number of empirical studies, for different countries, have estimated wage differentials between unionised and non-unionised workers and plants (i.e. using both individual and establishment data). Most of these studies have shown, even in different institutional contexts, that a wage premium is associated with union presence (LEWIS [1986] ; STEWART [1983 STEWART [ , 1987 ). Note that, given the structure of collective bargaining in Italy, the wage effect relevant for turnover patterns is mainly the one originated by decentralised bargaining taking place at the plant level, since all workers are basically covered by sectoral agreements (DELL'ARINGA and LUCIFORA [1994] ). In other words, through wage monopoly effects unions are likely to alter turnover rates mainly affecting workers quit decisions. Hence, unionised workers, or workers employed in plant covered by collective bargaining will have longer tenure because they get better salaries.
However, the impact of union activity on workers separation behaviour is more extensive than the simple introduction of a monopoly wage mark-up. For example, unions also care about the "value" of their members' job, and the bargained wage represents only one aspect of it. Workers' interests cover job satisfaction, job security, work safety and other non-wage attributes. Once the "value" of the job is taken into account then workers will quit only if better job opportunities (pecuniary or non pecuniary) are available elsewhere. Therefore, union objectives will also be concerned with nonwage aspects of the job which are valuable to workers 1 . Beside this, unions might seek to protect job security introducing restrictions and rigidities with respect to the employment policy of the firm. For instance, unions may set explicit rules for firing workers with the consequence that discharges would be more costly in unionised firms than in competitive firms. Higher turnover costs will reduce both accession and separation flows. According to this "monopoly" view of unionism, trade union activity is expected to reduce exit behaviour mainly through improved wage conditions and other non-pecuniary attributes of the job.
Alternatively, unions may contribute to lower turnover by giving the "voice" to workers to express their discontent and needs. Union collective voice represents workers during the bargaining process with firms and help them in claiming better working conditions and rules. The success of those claims affect the value of the job and it might be crucial in workers' quit decisions. Through the "collective voice" workers would feel more protected and satisfied with their job and so more willing to stay (FREEMAN [1980a] ). It has been shown that even holding wages and other pecuniary rewards fixed and controlling for selectivity bias, unionism is strongly associated with lower quits 2 . This means that unions can have a "collective voice" effect, quite independently from wage setting and from workers' characteristics. In the Italian context, the presence of the work-council (Consigli di fabbrica) in unionised plants may well have acted as a form of "collective voice" favouring the transmission of grievances and information from the workers to the management, and also contributing to the establishment of better job conditions. In other words, it could be said that union presence creates a particular "union environment" affecting workers behaviour and reducing voluntary separations.
The empirical literature on turnover has also stressed the fact that jobs in smaller firms have shorter and more variable duration than jobs in larger firms and that large firms tend to be strongly unionised (EVANS and LEIGHTON [1988] ; PEARCE [1990] ). It has been argued that large firms have lower turnover rates either because unionised or if not because of union threats. In other words, large non-unionised firms willing to keep their independence (they consider trade unions as a "threat") will set both higher wages and non pecuniary benefits (MELLOW [1982] ).
1. More recently greater attention has been devoted to the role of non-pecuniary elements. Workers mainly leave their firms because they are dissatisfied with their specific job quite independently from their current wage. In fact, a large number of job quits result in wage losses (AKERLOF, ROSE and YELLEN [1988] ).
2. So far we have not considered heterogeneity among workers. Namely, it might happen that union firms do not attract or select workers at random. This means that workers with low propensity to move (stayers) may be attracted or selected by unionised plants while the opposite would happen for workers with a high propensity to move (movers). This would be the source of the selectivity bias.
The Data
The data used in the present paper constitute a unique source of information as it combines information at the plant level on turnover rates, wage levels and other relevant establishment characteristics, together with union presence and union behaviour in the establishment. The data is drawn from the "Pay and Labour Condition Survey" of Federmeccanica, based on a sample of 3,000 establishments operating in the Italian metal-mechanical engineering industry. It refers to the 1990 survey and contains retrospective information on several variables 3 . The sample used in the empirical analysis was selected excluding missing values for our key variables (i.e. separation rates, wage, union density); this left us with 2,526 plants for which we had complete information. After inspection of the main features of the final data set, there is no reason to believe that non-responses are nonrandom. Taking into account both the geographical distribution and the size of establishments (i.e. even very small plants are included), the data set used can be considered a nationally representative sample of the industry under examination, which by itself represents the larger share of the whole manufacturing industry (34%).
A description of the variables used and their meaning is reported in table 2. As far as trade union presence and industrial relation practices are concerned, the following information has been used in the empirical analysis: first, the proportion of employees in the firm who are member of a union (i.e. defined as union density), second, the hours of strike per union member and, finally, an indicator of whether local collective bargaining occurs in the establishment. The wage variable is defined as average gross yearly earnings and includes base rate pay, local bargaining premia and other bonuses 4 . Also a number of control variables for differing labour quality, and average accumulated seniority in the establishment are included in the empirical analysis. The existence of training schemes, and the presence of collective redundancies have also been considered.
The most interesting aspect of the data set is that it allows to draw a distinction among different sources of worker and employerinduced separations -i.e. among voluntary quits, dismissals, end-of-contract separations, as well as hires, re-hires and in-plant transfers. A description 3. The Federmeccanica survey is run on an annual basis and covers a large number of firms operating in the metal-mechanical engineering industry in Italy. Information is collected through a postal questionnaire sent to the top managers of the firm. The rate of response is very high (over 80%) and both incompleteness questionnaires and non respondents are interviewed further by phone to check the reasons for the incomplete or absence of information supplied. 4. In principle, a measure of hourly wages would be preferable for estimation purposes. However, it should be noted that, since local bargaining wage premia and other bonuses are paid as lump-sum once a year, using yearly wages might not be inappropriate. In order to control for wage variations arising from differences in hours worked, overtime premia have been excluded and control variables proxying for differences in hours worked have been experimented (i.e. proportion of part-timers, proportion in shift-work, etc.).
TABLE 2
Description of the Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis.
Variables Description
Turnover rates QUITS Workers who voluntary leave the plant between t and t-1 DISMISSALS Workers who are dismissed (by the employer) between t and t-1 END-OF-CONTRACT Workers on temporary contracts which expired in the period HIRES Workers hired between t and t-1 RE-HIRES Workers temporarily laid-off who are re-hired between t and t-1 TRANSFERS (from-to) Workers who are transferred to (from) other plants of the available accession-separation rate disaggregation, and a discussion of their implications for the functioning of the establishment is presented, hereafter, in section 4.
The Empirical Specification and the Methodology of Analysis
As discussed in the preceding sections turnover rates can be explained by various economic models which focus on different aspects of workers' inflow-outflow behaviour. In the macroeconomic literature different concepts have been used to describe and analyse the dynamics of labour markets, and ultimately gross turnover rates and employment changes (CLARK and SUMMERS [1979] ; AKERLOF, ROSE and YELLEN [1988] ; BLANCHARD and DIAMOND [1990] ). In the present study, we intend to focus on the microeconomic aspects of turnover and examine the empirical evidence from the perspective of the individual firm or establishment. Recent research on employment dynamics has shown both the presence of simultaneous job creation and destruction, and the existence of a substantial worker turnover within the establishment HALTINWANGER [1990, 1992] ; HAMERMESH et al. [1994] ). A disaggregation of the different components of turnover rates can help to understand better the complex dynamics which underlies employment changes in the establishment. Yet, even if net employment change is zero, and no jobs are created or destroyed, a substantial worker turnover may still be observed in the establishment. As an example, consider a decomposition of the net change in employment ( ) in the -th establishment.
( 1) where , and are hires, re-hires and transfer from other plants, respectively; are quits, are end-of-term separations, and are lay-offs and dismissals, and are transfers to other plants. The distinction among the different components of turnover is important since each of them implies a different economic behaviour.
As far as the present study is concerned, the focus will be placed on the operation of the establishment neglecting whether entry or exit behaviour is associated with different labour market states (i.e. employment, unemployment, out of the labour force). With respect to (1), for sake of simplicity, first we incorporate into , next we neglect the net effect of , finally -given the Italian legislation on temporary lay-offs (CIG)-we only consider dismissals as having an effect on separations and employment. Hence, given the data, (1) is changed in the following way, (2) It is noteworthy that the data allow us to distinguish between separations initiated voluntarily by the worker , separations due to mandatory retirement or to the expiration of a temporary contract , those which are incentivated by the management -whose conditions are generally negotiated with the employer (i.e. including pre-retirement schemes)-, and separations initiated by the employer -i.e. dismissals. In section 6.1 a disaggregated analysis of these turnover flows is presented.
The Empirical Specification
The objective of this section is to formulate a suitable empirical model for workers' turnover rates at the establishment level. The focus will be placed on identifying the main determinants of the probability of workerfirm separation, initiated either by the employee or by the employer.
As discussed in one of the previous sections, the effects of unionism might come either through monopoly effects (i.e. on wages and turnover rates), or through "collective voice" effects (i.e. as an alternative to the standard market mechanism of entry and exit): in both cases unionisation is expected to reduce separations. In the empirical analysis we estimate various specifications of different separation equations controlling for current wages, outside opportunities, unionisation and several other control variables. Separate equations for total separation, voluntary quits and dismissals have been estimated.
Two features of the data suggest particular care in the specification of the empirical model: first, since the variable to be explained is a probability (i.e. the probability of quitting or being dismissed) least squares method is inappropriate. Second, since the data are grouped some care should be used in the estimation as the omoscedasticity requisite may not be satisfied. These statistical issues are discussed hereafter.
Some Statistical Issues
In this paper, total separations rates and their components are analysed by means of a probabilistic model in which each individual has a certain probability to exit in any given period. The "stay-or-go" decision has a dichotomous realisation which can take value 0 or 1 5 . Since our data set is available at the establishment level disaggregation, it implies that for each observation (i.e. the establishment) we shall have multiple individual observations (i.e. the workers) as it is the case with grouped data. In the -th establishment -in the time period considered-there will be workers corresponding to , among those for a subset of workers the separation occurred and for a subset the separation did not occur. Hence the empirical probabilities are,
Given that empirical probabilities are bounded between 0 and 1, the logistic can be an adequate functional form for the empirical analysis. Suppose that separation probabilities, in a given period, are made dependent on a set of explanatory factors , then we can write,
5. Note that in the simple case of a fixed probability it is possible to characterise the relationship between the mean of the completed tenure and the uniperiodal probability of separation in the following way, In practice, instead of (4), the transformation suggested by COX [1970] was used. The advantage with this transformation lies in that the logits are defined even when the extremes (0 or 1) are included, which is not the case with the above expression. Since with grouped data there is an inherent heteroscedasticity built into the model, a weighting procedure known as "Minimum Chi-Square Generalised Method" (MCSGM) has been used in all the estimations (BERKSON [1953] ) 6 . A side issue, neglected by most of the empirical literature, concerns the relationship between turnover and wages. In particular, it may be argued that wage setting should not be viewed as independent from turnover behaviour, as the wage-turnover relationship could arise from a joint decision process. In that case, the current wage should be treated as endogenously determined. Note that, as far as the present study is concerned, no effort has been made to deal with the potential endogeneity of the current wage variable. Hence, on this point, the present paper shares the same criticism raised to other empirical studies on the subject.
Results
In this section we shall present the main set of results. The effects of unionism on overall turnover and on its principal components are explored using micro-data at the establishment level. Firstly, a descriptive analysis of the data is presented in the attempt of establishing the main routes through which unions influence turnover; secondly, an econometric model is estimated and the relevance of union impact on turnover is statistically tested.
Some Descriptive Evidence of the Effects of Unions on Turnover
The evidence presented in many empirical studies has shown how the labour market is characterised by significant flows of workers who move across different labour market states (i.e. employment, unemployment, out of the labour force). This high labour market dynamics has some obvious implications for the employment policies in establishments which have to deal with substantial worker turnover rates. Firms have to take workers' separation decisions -such as those originating from mandatory retirement, expiring of temporary employment contracts, and more importantly those due to wage search behaviour and job shopping-as an operating constraint 6. It can be shown, MADDALA [1983] , that the variance i can be estimated by i i and used in weighted least-squares method to produce efficient estimates.
and organise labour resources optimally taking that constraint explicitly into account. In practice, firms may choose to shape pay policies and nonpecuniary aspects of the job so as to retain workers and reduce turnover rates. Alternatively, firms may adopt a passive role setting wages at market levels, thus experiencing high turnover rates as workers will intensively search for better job opportunities. Turnover behaviour is likely to represent an important attribute for individuals' working life, and -on the employer sideregulating turnover rates is an important strategic labour resource policy of the firm. In order to assess the importance of turnover for the functioning of the firm it is sufficient to consider the substantial amount of resources that firms systematically devote to the hiring and training of workers. Turnover rates can also be influenced by fluctuation in product demand, as firms have to adjust continuously employment levels to the profit maximising level of production. It is important to note that although the occurrence of adverse demand shocks is expected to influence primarily employerinduced separations (i.e. lay-offs and dismissals), nevertheless the whole structure of turnover rates is likely to be affected. One argument is that it is never profitable for the firm to lay off workers as employment can always be adjusted downward simply by cutting wage levels and inducing quits. In this case an increase in lay-offs is also accompanied by an increase in voluntary quits. The extent of lay-offs and quits will also depend on the availability of unemployment benefits and government subsidies to the laying-off firms. The Italian income supplementary benefit (i.e. the so-called CIG) is a clear example 7 .
In this respect, trade unionism can be expected to alter significantly the pattern of turnover rates. First, as previously mentioned, unions can reduce exit behaviour through "monopoly routes" which improve wages and other non-pecuniary attributes of the job. Alternatively unions can influence turnover through "voice routes" which provide alternative means of expressing discontent and of resolving industrial relations problems.
The above discussion suggests the existence of a great deal of heterogeneity in establishment-level employment changes and in turnover rates. In order to account for this heterogeneity, in this section we investigate the determinants of turnover rates, with particular reference to the role of unions, for the Italian metal-mechanical engineering industry. In particular, following the terminology introduced in some of the recent macroeconomic literature, we shall first look at gross creation and destruction of jobs across establishments, and then we shall compare the actual patterns of workers' turnover rates within the establishment HALTINWANGER [1990, 1992] ; HAMERMESH et al. [1994] ).
We define job reallocation as the sum of gross job creation (i.e. average employment gains in expanding establishments) and gross job destruction (i.e. average employment losses in contracting establishments) in a given 7. For additional evidence on the Italian experience see: SESTITO [1993, 1994] .
LABOUR TURNOVER AND UNIONISM sector between and 8 . In this respect, two caveats are to be explained before discussing the results. First, in our data set, year-to-year changes in establishment-level employment are only determined by changes in desired employment size, rather than by new or dying establishments. Second, since we observe only establishment-level employment, it cannot be determined whether a given level of employment -in two different time periods and for the same establishment-corresponds to the same or different job positions. For these reasons, the statistics on job creation and job destruction presented are likely to under-report the actual rate of job reallocation. Conversely, when we consider workers' turnover rates (i.e. worker reallocation as opposed to job reallocation) the actual number of accessions and separations occurred, in each establishment between and , is reported. We define turnover rate the sum of accession and separation probabilities within the establishment. In this case, the statistics on turnover are likely to overestimate the actual rate of job reallocation, as more workers might transitate over the same job. Finally, it should be noted that worker reallocation conveys greater information about labour market dynamics as it occurs as a result of life-cycle, career profile, job satisfaction and learning considerations in addition to response to job reallocation. Table 3 reports some descriptive evidence on the rate of job reallocation and workers turnover in the industry as a whole. Job reallocation in the metal-mechanical engineering industry between 1989 and 1990 is equal to 14.9 percent, with a significant variation around the mean. While average change in establishment-level employment in the industry is around 1 percent, we observe simultaneously significant job creation (7.2%) and job destruction (6.2%). A substantial worker reallocation is required to accomodate such job reallocation. Total turnover rate -measured as the sum of accession and separation rates-exhibits a figure of 26.2 percent, nearly the double of the observed job reallocation rate 9 . Focusing on separation rates it is worth noting that voluntary quits account for more than 86 percent of total separations, while dismissals for less than 4.2 percent. Hence, termination of a job depends primarily on worker-initiated decisions. On average, employees exhibit a probability of nearly 88 percent of holding the job in the establishment.
Given that these figures underline substantial heterogeneity across plants, for comparison purposes in table 3, we have also reported several average establishment characteristics and their dispersion. The figures suggest that the sample includes both large and small establishment (i.e. dispersion around the mean is significant), the average white-blue collar wage gap is around 30 percent, while union density is over 30 percent. On average, 10 percent of the workforce in the plant is in training, 60 percent 8. In order to compute rates, we take changes in absolute values for end of period employment (i.e. and ) and divide by average establishment employment-size. Note that job reallocation is calculated using plant employment figures, while workers' turnover is calculated directly over the reported flows between and . 9. Note that this figure is very close to the evidence reported, for the US, by DAVIS and HALTINWANGER [1992] . of the establishments are covered by a local collective agreement and approximately 8 percent of plants are under a CIG scheme. Given that some establishments are in a job creation regime (i.e. employment is growing), some have stable employment, and other are in a job destruction regime, in table 4 we present a disaggregated analysis of turnover rates and other establishment characteristics. Turnover rates appear to be higher in the job creation regime, as opposed to the other regimes, mainly as a result of higher hiring rates. As it might be expected, separation rates are higher in the job destruction regime, where both dismissal and quits show higher probabilities, which may give support to the hypothesis that quit behaviour is influenced by a higher probability of being dismissed.
Establishments' characteristics in different job regimes do not show any clear cut pattern. Plants in the job stability regime are smaller in size and less unionised, they pay lower wages and provide less training to their workers 10 . Conversely, plants in the job creation-destruction regimes appear fairly similar, the main differences being: a lower average seniority index in the job creation regime, probably due to the higher inflow of new entrants, and a higher diffusion of CIG schemes in the job destruction regime, probably indicating a higher incidence of collective redundancies. Focusing on the patterns of unionisation, it may be interesting to evaluate whether the presence of trade unions influences in some way the job regime in which the establishment is classified, or affects the accession-separation behaviour in the plant. In table 4, union density levels do not show any specific pattern across regimes, therefore we find no evidence that unionism influences the likelihood that a plant falls in one particular job regime.
More interestingly, table 5 presents a disaggregation of different job regimes by union density levels. Three intervals have been chosen: no-union, low and high union density -i.e. the latter being above 50 percent. One noteworthy fact emerges from table 5: turnover rates decline significantly as union density in the establishment increases, and this occurs independently from the job regime in which the plant is classified 11 . On average, comparing establishments where there are no unions with establishments where union density is above 50 percent, accession and separation rates are reduced by a half. While there is also a modest decline in turnover rates between the low and high union density establishments, the big reduction is to be found between establishments with and without unions. The observed pattern of turnover rates is replicated (inversely) by average seniority in the establishment -i.e. where union density is high, turnover is low and accumulated seniority high. Note: * Total membership over total employment in the establishment.
One problem which is to be found in comparing turnover patterns across union density levels has to do with the existence of a set of characteristics which might be correlated with local union density and, independently from union practices, can influence the accession-separation behaviour. In order to account for this possibility, in table 6, we present turnover rates restricting the analysis to narrowly defined groups, such as 3-digit industry, 11. It is important to note, as shown by the empirical evidence reported, that the influence of unionism is neither confined to one particular job regime; nor is due to either selection procedures in growing establishment, or to constraints imposed to contracting plants.
establishment size, and whether local bargaining occurs. When comparisons are made within such groups, the likelihood that omitted factors can account for a significant proportion of the observed differences in turnover patterns is greatly reduced. Turnover rates, across industries, range from 31 to 23, with no systematic variations in the accession-separation behaviour.
Conversely, the establishment size shows a clear negative relationship with turnover rates. In other words, accession-separation rates are shown to be significantly lower when the plant size increases 12 . Also, note that the existence of a local collective agreement, in the establishment, has a negative impact on the extent of turnover. Considering that both plant size and decentralised bargaining are likely to be correlated with union density, it is hardly surprising to find that turnover is indeed negatively correlated with the above mentioned plant characteristics. This finding is particularly important, since it suggests that the omission of any of these establishment attributes is likely to produce biased estimates of the impact of unions on turnover. Finally, in the last column of table 6 simple bivariate correlations between total separations and average wages are reported. In all sub-groups, negative correlations are detected, thus supporting the hypothesis that higher wages in the plant have a depressing effect on exit probability.
In order to get a clearer picture of the relationship between turnover rates and union density, a finer disaggregation is presented in table 7. The evidence confirms previous findings. First, accession-separation rates decline monotonically with unionisation. Whilst, unions seem to have a mild influence on dismissal, their effect on quits is strong. The probability of quitting for a worker employed in an establishment with no unions is 50 percent higher than in establishments where unions are strong. Second, there is evidence for non-union and low-union establishments to be smaller sized. Since, turnover rates are decreasing with establishing size (see table 6), it will be important to disentangle the two effects. Furthermore, average seniority in a highly unionised establishment is almost double when compared with non-union plant.
Econometric Results
In this section econometric methods are used to analyse the determinants of turnover and evaluate the effects of unionism. Since, as discussed at some length in the previous sections, it is important to isolate the various routes through which unions might affect turnover, we introduce different proxies for unionisation. In particular, we shall distinguish among the "coverage effect" of decentralised collective bargaining, the "union power effect" given by union density in the establishment and the "conflict effect" produced by strike activity. These factors, as discussed below, represent potentially different effects of union presence and union behaviour on turnover patterns.
Hereafter, several separation equations are estimated. In some specifications industry dummies have been included to control for industry specific characteristics that may influence turnover behaviour. However, since the range of variation of the variable measuring alternative wage opportunities is limited to the industry-level, the latter is never included simultaneously with the vector of industry controls 13 . In general, parameter estimates show expected signs and are robust to changes in specification. In table 8, we present estimates of total separations, quits, and dismissals equations, respectively. In all equations, with the only exception of dismissals, union density (UDENS) has a negative, statistically significant, impact on the probability of separation. Note that, since regressions also include current wages and other controls, the effect of union density on separations is likely to reflect essentially non-wage effects. In the light of the theoretical implications previously seen, this finding confirms the hypothesis that the existence of a union, besides its effects on wages, significantly reduces exit behaviour. A further channel through which unions are expected to reduce separation probability is the existence of collective bargaining activity in the establishment. However, results show that the existence of a local collective bargaining agreement (CONTR) does not reduce exit. Coefficient estimates are wrongly signed and not significant in most of the cases 14 . In other words, union effects on turnover do not seem to come through formal bargaining. Hours of strike (HSTRIKE) are included to measure the level of conflict in the establishment. Strikes are expression of grievances and discontent of the workforce which could not be dealt with the voice mechanism. The estimated effect on separation probability is positive and statistically significant, hence a high level of conflict raises exit propensity. Exit probability should be negatively related to the current wage, relative to the mean of the alternative wage distribution: high wages are likely to raise the benefits of the current job vis-à-vis outside options and decrease exit behaviour. Moreover, union monopoly effects predict that unions raise wages above the competitive level and, in doing so, further reduce separations. The estimated effect of wages (WAGE) on the probability of separation is negative and statistically significant. In particular, higher wages -other characteristics held fixed-reduce worker-initiated separations, while they appear to have the opposite effect (though non statistically significant) on the probability of employer-initiated separations. As previously discussed, some care is needed in interpreting the estimated effect of wages on turnover since endogeneity bias might affect the results. If length of tenure is specifically paid for, then higher wages resulting from accumulated seniority and lower quits, will -while raising the opportunity cost-reduce worker's propensity to leave the job 15 . However, the inclusion of current wages in a quit regression, as shown by FREEMAN [1980a, b] , is likely to impose a more stringent test on the estimated effects of unionism on exit behaviour 16 . One important determinant of separation behaviour, as emphasised in the descriptive analysis of the previous section, is the size of the plant. Regression results show that exit probability decreases monotonically with establishment size (D). Note that, independently from union presence, large establishments are more likely to favour institutional mechanisms for aggregating worker preferences and the development of "voice" mechanisms such as grievance-arbitration that reduce voluntary separations. Also employer-induced separations are lower in larger establishments. Large plants represent more stable organisations which have an interest in devising an internal governance structure -i.e. the internal labour market-to assure a long-term relation between the workers and the firm 17 . Also the possibility of advancement within the firm, which is likely to be higher in larger organisations, represents an important attribute of the job which may reduce turnover. Finally, considering the public-good nature of the voice mechanism, it may also be argued that it is less costly to create such a system in large plants.
The existence of particular skills, such as vocational or on-the-job training, which are specific to the establishment have the effect of increasing the cost of mobility, thus reducing the probability of separation. We investigated this hypothesis including in the estimated equations a variable measuring whether the establishment provides training to its workers (TRAIN). The estimated coefficients show negative and statistically significant effects only on quits. Therefore, investment in specific human capital is effective in reducing worker voluntary-separation, but does not affect other forms of exit behaviour.
Notwithstanding the fact that our data set allows to distinguish different exit behaviour, in order to control for the possibility that quits may represent 15. Note, however, that several authors have questioned the relevance of tenure effects on wages (ALTONJI and SHAKOTKO [1987] ; ABRAHAM and FARBER [1987, 1988] ). If no reward is paid for accumulated seniority, then wages are independent with respect to tenure and their inclusion (as independent variable) in a quit equation creates no problem. FREEMAN [1980a, b] has shown the direction and the extent of the bias due to the inclusion of current wages in a tenure (quit) regression. 16. FREEMAN [1980a, b] discusses the direction and the extent of the bias due to the inclusion of current wages in a tenure regression. 17. In the analysis of the idiosyncratic exchange model, WILLIAMSON, WACHTER and HARRIS [1975] , provide very similar justifications to explain the incentive that large organisations have to regularise trading relations in the labour market. They argue that with non (or imperfectly) transferable skills, the worker and the firm have a mutual interest in devising a governance structure that guarantees a stable relation between them, and reduces the exit probability.
hidden lay-offs, we introduced a dummy variable indicating whether an establishment was covered by the CIG wage supplementation scheme for collective redundancies (CIG). The existence of collective redundancies, as one might expect, shows a positive effect on total separations and on employer-initiated separations, conversely the effect on quits is never statistically significant. Hence, the risk that the establishment might go out of business does not appear to influence quit behaviour in a systematic way.
In most cases where workers quit their current job, they do so to take up another job which offers better conditions. In general, workers have an idea of the wage offer distribution outside the firm, which -conditional on the current wage earned-is expected to influence positively the quit probability. We introduced a proxy for the alternative wage outside the firm (ALTWAGE), which turned out to be statistically significant and has the expected sign only in the quits equation. Several other variables have been included to control for average labour quality and for heterogenous turnover patterns -i.e. quits rise when labour quality rises relative to wages. The two proxies measuring average labour quality in the establishment confirm theoretical expectations: the percentage of blue-collar workers (BLCOLPC) -a negative quality measure-and the percentage of managers (MANPC) are statistically significant and show a negative and a positive sign, respectively. Finally, the percentage of female workers in the establishment (FEMPC) -ceteris paribus-has a negative impact on quits. The interpretation of the latter result is not straghtforward as it reflects many different effects, namely: discrimination and non-market effects.
In table 9, the variable measuring average accumulated seniority in the establishment has been added to separation and quit equations. The inclusion of elapsed tenure in the regressions can be interpreted in different ways: on one side, tenure may serve to condition separation rates to different average plant seniority; on the other side, tenure can be taken to represent unobserved factors that affect both future exit behaviour and past employment stability in the establishment 18 . In terms of the job-matching literature, average tenure should proxy for those (unobserved) characteristics of the establishment which are likely to favour successful job-matches, and that -ceteris paribusshould reduce the propensity to quit. Regression results are not substantially affected by the inclusion of tenure: estimated coefficients retain their signs and are statistically significant (though smaller in magnitude). The seniority index exhibits a negative impact on total separations and on quits. Also, the persistent effect of union density on quits can be interpreted as highly supportive of the union voice hypothesis. Workers in highly unionised establishments are less likely to quit than workers employed in low-union plants, even at comparable job tenure.
The analysis has so far investigated the main determinants of turnover patterns, highlighting a substantial effect of unions on separation rates that goes beyond the one due to union monopoly wage gains. Are, however, the 18. One problem is as follows, if tenure is correlated with current wages and with the error term, then parameter estimates might be biased. Since the extent of the bias is not obvious, results should be interpreted bearing this caveat in mind. equations obtained disaggregating the sample by plant size and by union density intervals 19 . The negative impact of union density on quits, given current wages, is confirmed in both sub-samples. Also estimated coefficients 19. This procedure is equivalent to the introduction of interaction terms between the included variables and plant size or union density dummies. Essentially parameter estimates are not constrained to be the same across size and union density of establishments.
on current wages and alternative wages confirm previous results. As far as plant size is concerned two size-groups have been considered: establishments with less than 50 employees and those with over 50 workers. Although most parameters appear robust in both sub-groups, there is evidence that some characteristics might play a different role in small vis-à-vis large plants.
The impact of outside options on quit probability appears more relevant for small establishments, suggesting that medium-large plants might be more insulated with respect to the conditions of the external labour market. Also, other factors being equal, the influence of unionism on quits is more pronounced for large sized plants. Coming to differences in unionisation we estimated three quit equations: one, for non-union establishments, the second and the third for low (1-50 percent) and high-union establishments (51-100 percent) respectively 20 . Coefficient estimates mostly maintain their previous signs, though the impact on quit probability differs across union density intervals. Current wages (especially in non-union establishments) and plant size dummies (especially in union establishments) reduce quits; seemingly, investment in training is effective in reducing worker-induced separations if unions are present. Essentially, where unions are not present the wage paid seem to play a key role in reducing quits; while in unionised plants -though pecuniary aspects are still important-other aspects are as well important in regulating voluntary exit. Coefficient estimates of the alternative wage do not appear very robust across different groupings; nevertheless, given the way the ALTWAGE variable has been computed, it is likely to suffer from an excessive disaggregation of the data. Once more the presence of unions seem to suggest the existence of institutions, which operate in alternative to the standard market mechanism, directed to regulate turnover behaviour in the establishment.
Concluding Remarks
This study has examined turnover behaviour in the Italian metalmechanical engineering industry. In particular, the focus has been placed on the effects of unionism on workers' accession-separation behaviour. First, we described the evolution of the Italian institutional setting over the past twenty years, and the way it affected aggregate turnover rates. Next, we discussed the likely impact of trade unions distinguishing between monopoly wage and collective voice effects.
In the empirical analysis we provided evidence for the existence of simultaneous job creation and destruction within an industry. High 20. Note that the plant size dummy, D4, has been excluded from the non-union establishment grouping, since there are no large establishments (i.e. over 250 employees) without at least some union members.
job reallocation rates have been found to be associated to even higher accession and separation rates within establishments, suggesting that only a part of it is due to effective job reallocation. In this context, the presence of a trade union in the establishment appears to be systematically associated with substantially lower turnover rates. This effect is pervasive and, independently from cyclical reasons or demand shocks, is common across different three digit industries -i.e. within the metal-mechanical engineering-, establishment sizes, and bargaining arrangements. An empirical specification for the analysis of exit behaviour has been derived next and estimated using micro-data at the establishment level. The main sets of results show that union density -even controlling for monopoly wage effects-has a negative and statistically significant impact on turnover patterns. The existence of training schemes and specific (to the establishment) skills has been shown to reduce turnover further, however this effect mainly comes through the reduction of voluntary separations. Also, in line with previous results, we find evidence for large sized plants to be associated with lower turnover rates.
In conclusion, it can be argued that, in the Italian metal-mechanical engineering industry, trade union behaviour had a significant role in reducing firms' reallocation rates altering both employment change and workers' entry-exit behaviour. These effects may come through both standard monopoly-wage routes, as well as non-wage routes such as the "collective voice" mechanism.
